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THE PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following 
parties were named as plaintiffs and as defendants before the District Court: 
Plaintiffs: Kevan Francis and Rebecca Ives, individually and as the natural 
parents of Samuel Ives, deceased. 
Defendants: The State of Utah and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On January 30, 2009, the trial court issued a Ruling granting defendants' Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Addendum at 1-10; hereinafter "Add. ") On February 
23, 2009, the trial court entered a Judgment that dismissed the action with prejudice. 
(R.000098-99) Plaintiffs filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Judgment on March 
13, 2009. (R.000101-103) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in granting defendants' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings based on a determination that the failure to close a 
campsite, until a bear that had attacked campers at that campsite was destroyed, 
constituted a failure to "revoke authorization" to use the campsite, and therefore 
the State of Utah was immune under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, even 
though there was no authorization required to use the campsite. 
The case was disposed of on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which is 
reviewed under a correctness standard, with no deference to the trial court's decision. 
Houghton v. Department of Health, 57 P.3d 1067, 1069 (Utah 2002). In addition, the 
case was dismissed based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which is a ruling that 
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Such dismissals raise matters of law that are 
also reviewed with no deference to the trial court's decision. Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 
P.3d 632, 645 (Utah 2002). Plaintiffs filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R.000101-103), 
which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. Whether the trial court erred in granting defendants' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act with 
respect to Plaintiffs' allegation that the State is liable because of a failure to warn 
that a dangerous bear had entered the campsite, for which there would be no 
immunity under the Act, because the Complaint alleged, in the alternative, that the 
State is liable because it failed to cause the campsite to be closed until the bear was 
destroyed, which the trial court ruled was immune from suit under the Act. 
The case was disposed of on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which is 
reviewed under a correctness standard, with no deference to the trial court's decision. 
Houghton v. Department of Health, 57 P.3d 1067, 1069 (Utah 2002). In addition, the 
case was dismissed based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which is a ruling that 
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Such dismissals raise matters of law that are 
also reviewed with no deference to the trial court's decision. Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 
P.3d 632, 645 (Utah 2002). Plaintiffs filed a timely Notice of Appeal (Rec. 000101-103), 
which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IIL Whether the trial court erred in granting defendants' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by 
applying the failure to revoke authorization exception when it was the Federal 
government, not the State of Utah, that had the authority to close the campsite. 
The case was disposed of on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which is 
reviewed under a correctness standard, with no deference to the trial court's decision. 
Houghton v. Department of Health, 57 P.3d 1067, 1069 (Utah 2002). In addition, the 
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case was dismissed based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which is a ruling that 
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Such dismissals raise matters of law that are 
also reviewed with no deference to the trial court's decision. Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 
P.3d 632, 645 (Utah 2002). Plaintiffs filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R.000101-103), 
which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The trial court's dismissal was based on the following section of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)(c): 
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under 
Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
results from: 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, 
license, certificate, approval", order, or similar authorization; 
In the case law, the above-quoted provision is usually referred to by its pre-2004 
number, Utah Code § 63-30-10(3). It will be referred to in this Brief by its current 
number, "Section 301(5)(c)." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
This case arises out of a tragic bear attack that killed a young boy camping with 
his family in the American Fork Canyon area. The same bear had attacked, but not 
harmed, campers early in the morning on the same day, at the very same campsite. The 
bear was declared a Level III nuisance bear, and a State of Utah regulation requires that 
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such a bear be destroyed, and that campers and any other items that might attract a bear 
be kept away from the site of the attack until the bear is destroyed. 
State officials attempted to track and kill the bear beginning within hours of the 
first attack, but were unable to find the bear that day. Tragically, despite failing to find 
the bear, the State officials never attempted to keep campers away from the campsite in 
question, or even warn those attempting to use the campsite. As a result, the decedent's 
family camped at the very same spot of the attack, the very same day, without any 
knowledge that an attack had taken place that morning. The bear returned, attacked once 
again, and this time the result was fatal. Plaintiffs have sued the State of Utah alleging 
that the failure to either warn Plaintiffs or cause the campsite to be closed until the bear 
was destroyed was negligent and the cause of the child's death. 
The issue before this Court is whether this conduct is provided immunity under the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act"). While the Act waives governmental 
immunity for negligence claims, the trial court ruled that the following exception to the 
waiver of immunity applies, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (hereinafter "Section 
301(5)(c)"): 
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under 
Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
results from: 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
The trial court ruled that keeping campers from using the campsite in question 
would have constituted a "revocation" of the "authorization" to use that campsite. Based 
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on this, the trial court ruled that defendants were immune from suit. Plaintiffs contend 
that this is error for three reasons: 
First, closing the campsite would not have constituted the revocation of an 
"authorization." Plaintiffs needed no permission or authorization to use the campsite in 
question. Under the plain language of the Act, the exception applies only if there is a 
grant of authorization that the State then fails to revoke, but here there was no such 
authorization to revoke. 
Second, the Complaint alleges two alternative theories of negligence, a failure to 
warn Plaintiffs of the danger, and a failure cause the campsite to be closed while the bear 
was being destroyed. Even if Act granted immunity for the theory based on the failure to 
close the campsite, there would be no immunity for the claim based on the failure to 
warn. Warning campers of the presence of a dangerous animal does not involve a 
"revocation of authority." At a minimum, therefore, Plaintiffs should have been 
permitted proceed on the theory that the State is liable for its failure to warn. 
Third, the Federal government, not the State, had the power to close the campsite. 
Although the area in question was jointly managed by the State and Federal governments, 
the campsite was on Federal land, and the applicable regulation required the State to 
request that the Federal government close the campsite. Assuming that closing a 
campsite constitutes revoking an "authorization," Section 301(5)(c) would still not apply 
because the Act applies to a failure by the State to revoke authorization, not a failure by 
the Federal government to revoke authorization. 
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The Course Of Proceedings And Disposition In The Trial Court 
Plaintiffs filed a two-count Complaint. Count I alleges negligence against the 
State of Utah and Count II alleges negligence, based on the same facts, against the Utah 
Division of Wildlife Resources. (R.000001-7) Defendants shall jointly be referred to as 
the "State." After filing an Answer (R.000022-31), the State filed a Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings, arguing that the Utah Governmental Immunity Statute (the "Act") 
precluded any lawsuit based on these events. (R.000038-45) The Court granted that 
Motion on January 30, 2009. (Add. 1-10) 
Although not directly related to this case, the Court should be aware that Plaintiffs 
filed a similar lawsuit against the Federal government, because Federal and State agents 
had joint responsibility for administering this area. The Federal government moved to 
dismiss based on the immunity provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act. By 
Memorandum Decision and Order dated January 30, 2009, the United States District 
Court denied that motion, ruling that the claims against the Federal government were not 
covered by any exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Francis v. U.S., 2009 WL 
236691 (D.Utah 2009, Kimball, J).1 
Statement Of Facts 
On the night of June 16-17, 2007, a group camped at an unimproved 
campsite approximately one mile above the Timpanooke Recreation Area in the 
American Fork Canyon. At approximately 5:30 a.m. on the morning of June 17, a 
bear came into the campsite, raided the coolers, and ripped open one of the tents. 
1
 A copy of Judge Kimball's decision is attached at Add. 11-30. 
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The campers were able to chase off the bear without anyone being injured. The 
campers immediately notified defendant Utah Division of Wildlife Services 
directly and through other agencies. (R.000006) 
After receiving this report, the State decided that the bear was a Level III 
nuisance. (R.000006) A State regulation requires that such a bear be destroyed. 
(Add. 12) The State regulation further provides that any campsite where the bear 
was active should be kept free of any "attractants" until the bear is destroyed: 
Division employees should request that land management agencies close or 
restrict the use of campgrounds where nuisance black bears are active until 
the source of the problem (attractant) has been removed and/or the 
offending bear has been removed. (Add. 7-8) 
Campers, who bring food, are "attractants," and therefore this regulation requires 
that all campers be removed until the bear has been destroyed. 
Pursuant to this regulation, State agents went to the campsite on the 
afternoon of June 17, with dogs, and attempted to locate and euthanize the 
offending bear. (R.000005) At about 4:00 p.m. the State agents terminated the 
search without locating the bear, deciding to continue the search the next morning. 
(R.000005) Although the bear was still at large, the State placed no notice on the 
campsite in question, nor made any effort to warn campers or keep them away 
from the campsite. The State also failed to request that the Federal government 
close the campsite. (R.000005) 
The State has admitted the following: 
a State employee left an unimproved area thought to be (the site of the 
attack) at approximately 5:00 p.m. and the employee did not post notices 
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about the bear or attempt to warn unknown users of the unimproved area. 
The State affirmatively states that the employee left the unimproved area 
unoccupied and clean of any attractants. (R.000029) 
In the last sentence of the quoted paragraph, the State appears to be suggesting that 
since the campsite was free of campers at 5:00 p.m., no steps needed to be taken to 
insure than campers did not enter this area after 5:00 p.m. The trial court rejected 
any such suggestion, noting that "the State did not follow (its) internal regulation." 
(Add. 8) 
Shortly after the State terminated its search, Rebecca Ives, Tim Mulvey, 
Jack Mulvey ("Plaintiffs") and Samuel Ives entered the very same campsite. 
Plaintiffs were not required to seek permission to use the campsite in question, 
which was an unimproved campsite. They had no knowledge of the events that 
had taken place that morning. At about 9:00 p.m. they went to bed. (R.000005) 
Sometime before midnight, the bear returned, slit open the tent, and carried off 
Samuel Ives, who was mortally wounded. On the following day, the bear was 
located and destroyed. (R.000004) 
The Complaint alleges negligence against both the State of Utah (Count I) 
and the State of Utah Division of Wildlife Services (Count II) based on the 
following: 
The Complaint contains no allegation of any permission or authorization being required 
to use the campsite in question, which, by the State's admission, is "unimproved." 
(R.000001-7) Thus, a fair inference to draw (and all inferences favorable to Plaintiffs 
must be drawn) is that no permission or authorization was required to use this campsite. 
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a. The State agents left the campground without placing any notices 
about the Level III nuisance bear, or attempting to notify potential users of 
the campground of the imminent danger presented by the Level III bear. 
b. The Utah Division of Wildlife agents failed to request that the 
Federal Agents close the campground and thereby remove any attractants 
until the bear could be destroyed. 
c. The Utah Division of Wildlife agents failed to remove any 
attractants, or assure that campers with food (attractants) were kept from 
coming into the campground. (R.000004)) 
There is one factual error in the trial court's discussion of the facts that is 
significant. The trial court stated that "Plaintiffs would not have camped had the State 
revoked authorization" for them to camp. (Add. 9; emphasis added) The land in 
question, however, is owned by the Federal government, and the Federal government was 
the entity that could have closed the campsite. That is why the State's regulation 
provides that the State should request that "land management agencies" - which refers to 
the Federal government - should close the campsite. (Add. 7) That is also why the 
Complaint alleges that the State should have warned Plaintiffs, and should have requested 
that Federal agents close the campground. (R.000004) Indeed, the State has itself taken 
the position that it could only request the closure of the campsite. (R.000074) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") waives immunity from suit for 
claims based on negligence. Utah Code Ann. § 63(G)-7-301(4). However, the Act has 
exceptions to that waiver, and the sole basis for the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint 
was the application of the following exception: 
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(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under 
Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
results from: 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization.... 
(Section 63G-7-301(5)(c); emphasis added) 
The terms "failure" "to" "revoke" "authorization" are highlighted because it was 
that language in the Act that the trial court deemed applicable. The trial court ruled that 
the wrong alleged by Plaintiffs was that the authorities should have closed the campsite in 
question. Although no permit or permission of any kind had been required to camp at the 
campsite in question, the State argued, and the trial court agreed, that closing the 
campsite would have constituted a "revocation" of "authorization," and therefore the 
State was immune from suit. Plaintiffs will show that this ruling is incorrect as a matter 
of law for three reasons: 
First, Section 301(5)(c) does not apply to temporarily closing a campground until 
a dangerous animal is destroyed. The Act creates an exemption for claims based on the 
issuance or failure to revoke permits or licenses or other similar authorizations. This 
exemption arises in situations where the State has to determine whether someone 
qualifies to undertake a regulated activity, such as operating business or driving a car. 
There is no permit or authorization or set of qualifications required to use the campsite in 
question, and this claim, therefore, does not involve harm caused by a failure to revoke a 
permit or authorization. This claim arises out of the State's failure to follow its own 
regulation for dealing with a Level III nuisance bear. 
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Second, Plaintiffs alleged an alternative theory of negligence, only one of which is 
potentially covered by Section 301(5)(c). The Complaint alleges that the State failed to 
place a warning at the campground (R.000004, <| 28(a)), and, in the alternative, that it 
failed to either keep campers from using the campsite, or cause the Federal government 
to close the campsite. (R.000004, f^ 28(b)) The failure to warn basis for liability involves 
no "revocation" of "authorization" because it does not involve precluding anyone from 
using the campsite. The trial court, however, held because one of the alleged acts of 
negligence - the failure to close the campsite - was subject to an exemption from 
liability, the State was immune from any claim relating to this incident. This is not a 
correct interpretation of the Act. 
Third, if one assumes that the claim arises out of a failure to revoke an 
authorization, it was the Federal government that had to power to close the campsite, not 
the State. The Act, however, should only apply to the State's failure to revoke an 
authorization. The trial court's dismissal incorrectly found the State immune based a 
perceived Federal failure to revoke an authorization. This is a particularly troubling 
ruling given that the United States District Court has ruled that the Federal government is 
not immune for its conduct. (Add. 11-30) Under the trial court's ruling, the State is 
immune for a failure of action by the Federal government, but the Federal government is 
not immune for that very same conduct. 
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ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
The case below was disposed of on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 
Accordingly, the Court must "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true ... 
and consider such allegations 'and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Healthcare Services Group, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of 
Health, 40 P.3d 591, 593 (Utah 2002). 
I. Section 301(5)(c) Does Not Apply To Any Part 
Of The Complaint Because The Temporary Closing Of 
A Campsite Is Not A Failure To Revoke An "Authorization." 
Under the Act, ua governmental entity is immune from liability if it can show the 
following: (1) the activity giving rise to liability served a government function; (2) 
governmental immunity is not waived for the activity; or (3) if immunity is waived, then 
the activity falls within an exception to the waiver." Hoyer v. State•, 2009 UT 38, 2009 
WL 1706511 (Utah 2009). It is undisputed that the activity at issue served a 
governmental function, and it is also that the Act waives immunity for claims of 
negligence. Utah Code Ann. § 63(G)-7-301(4). The sole question in this appeal, 
therefore, is whether the exception to the Act's waiver found in Section 301(5)(c) applies 
to the facts of this case. 
The trial court ruled that Section 301(5)(c) was applicable because the failure to 
close the campground in question was a failure to revoke an authorization. The 
fundamental problem with this ruling is that there was never any permit, permission or 
authorization granted to Plaintiffs to camp there. In order to trigger the application of the 
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Act's provision on the failure to revoke an authorization, the activity in question must 
involve the State issuing an authorization to conduct that activity in the first place. There 
is, however, nothing in the record suggesting that any authorization was needed to use the 
campsite in question. Furthermore, governmental immunity is an affirmative defense, 
and the State therefore had the burden of proving that authorization was granted to 
Plaintiffs that should have been revoked. Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 851 (Utah 
2004) ("Governmental immunity is an affirmative defense"); Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 
919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996) ("Immunity is an affirmative defense which must be 
proved by the defendant). 
The trial court, although never explicitly stating this, must have thought that to 
camp on any publicly-owned land involves some sort of implied permission from the 
government. This would require applying Section 301(5)(c) where there is no explicit 
license, permission or authorization involved. There is, however, nothing in the plain 
language of Section 301(5)(c) that extends its reach beyond explicit grants of permits, 
licenses or other similar authorizations, and the Court has previously rejected extending 
the Act beyond its plain language: 
We decline to stray from the plain meaning of the text where the statute is 
unambiguous and there is no compelling reason to believe that the 
legislature has misspoken. 
Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Com 'n., 175 P.3d 1042, 1046 (Utah 2007); accord, 
Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, 2009 WL 1706511 (Utah 2009) ("we seek to given effect to 
the purpose and intent of the legislature.... To that end, we begin by examining the 
statute's plain language"). 
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When read as a whole, the plain language of Section 301(5)(c) shows that it is 
concerned with regulaled activities where the State has to determine whether someone 
qualifies to undertake a particular regulated activity. Section 301(5)(c) lists five specific 
kinds of actions that it applies to - "permits, licenses, certificates, approvals and orders" 
- plus a catchall category of "similar authorizations." The trial court relied on the 
catchall category of "similar authorizations" because there was no "permit, license, 
certificate, order, or approval" involved. Since the term "authorization" is limited to 
those situations that are "similar" to the five specifically enumerated acts, "authorization" 
refers to situations that, while are not technically designated as permits, licenses, 
certificates, approvals or orders, are qualitatively the same kind conduct. 
What, then, is included in the terms "permit, license, certificate, order or 
approval?" Although the State issues dozens of permits, licenses, certificates, approvals 
and orders, the common thread is that they all involve situations in which the State has to 
determine whether someone qualifies to undertake a regulated activity. There are some 
activities anyone is allowed to do, and there are other regulated activities that only 
qualified individuals can undertake. For example, anyone can hike in a state forest, but 
only those with a proper permit can remove timber. Anyone can bike or walk on a road, 
but only those with a driver's license can drive a car on a road. Anyone can buy land, but 
only those with a permit can build a home on the land. Section 301(5)(c) grants the State 
immunity from decisions in which the State decides whether or not someone meets the 
qualifications for undertaking a regulated activity. 
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A few examples from each of the categories listed in Section 301(5)(c) will 
illustrate this point: 
Permits 
Coal Mines: Utah Code § 40-10-6(4) provides that no one can open a coal mine 
without receiving a permit, and the statute lists the criteria for approval of such a permit. 
Discharge of waste products: A permit is required and the statute lists the factors 
to decide whether such a permit should be granted, Utah Code § 19-5-108. 
Licenses 
Dairy Operations: A license is needed to operate most business, included 
operations that make dairy products. Utah Code § 4-3-8. 
Sale of Tobacco: A license is required. Utah Code § 59-14-201. 
Practice of Medicine: The statute requires a license before anyone can practice 
medicine. Utah Code § 58-67-301. 
Certificates 
Insurance companies: A certificate of authority is needed before a company can 
sell insurance in Utah. Utah Code § 31A-5-212. 
Motor Clubs: A certificate is needed to operate a motor club. Utah Code § 31A-
11-106. 
Approvals 
Although the term "approval" might at first seem vague, it is in fact a specific term 
used in the Utah Code to provide for situations where prior State approval is needed to 
undertake a regulated activity, although a license or permit is not involved: 
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Building a waste disposal facility: To build any such facility one must first obtain 
"approval" from the State. Utah Code § 19-6-108. 
Labeling on malt liquor beverages: All labeling and packing must receive 
"approval" before it can be used. Utah Code § 32A-1-804. 
Motor vehicle lighting devices and safety equipment: These must first receive 
"approval" before they can be sold to the public. Utah Code § 41-6a-1620. 
Orders 
An "order" in the Utah Code refers to situations in which permission is needed, 
but the qualifications are more specific to the individual project than would be the case 
with a license or permit. For example: 
Construction of a treatment plant for discharging waste products into water: An 
order granting permission is needed. Utah Code § 19-5-104(g). 
Insurance company's right to operate: In addition to the normal qualifications that 
must be met to get a certificate, the State has the right to issue orders to impose additional 
conditions in specific situations. Utah Code §31A-5-103. 
* * * 
What this survey shows is that "permit, license, certificate, approval, and order" 
have a specific meaning in Utah law. The use of these terms in the immunity under the 
Act should therefore be interpreted consistently with how those terms are used elsewhere 
in the Utah Code. Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) ("It is also 
our duty to construe a statutory provision so as to make it harmonious with other statutes 
relevant to the subject matter"). Each term refers to a situation where the Legislature, by 
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statute, has given the State the right to determine whether someone qualifies to undertake 
a regulated activity. The statutes also almost always include the right to suspend or 
revoke the permit or license if necessary. The reason for providing immunity in such 
situation is that governmental official should not be second-guessed as to whether 
someone does or does not qualify for a permit or license. 
The term "authorization," therefore, must be interpreted to apply to situations that 
have the same characteristics. This means it applies only to situations where the 
legislature requires the State to determine whether someone qualifies to undertake a 
regulated activity, even though the State's permission is not specifically designated as a 
permit, license, certificate, order or approval. 
The facts in this case fall far outside the scope of this provision. There are no 
qualifications to use the campsite in question, and no permission or authorization of any 
kind was required. Neither the State nor the Federal Government ever make a 
determination as to whether someone qualifies to use this campsite. The temporary 
closure of the campsite in question, therefore, would not have involved a decision that 
anyone failed to meet the qualifications for using the campsite. Rather, the issue was 
simply keeping the public away from a known danger. This is not in any way similar to a 
licensing decision or a decision to issue a permit or certificate. 
E.g., Utah Code § 40-10-22 (procedure for revoking a coal mine permit); Utah Code § 
58-1-401 (procedure for revoking a license to practice medicine); Utah Code § 31A-4-
103 (procedure for revoking an insurance company's certificate); Utah Code § 19-6-
108(12) (procedure for revoking a waste disposal facility building approval). 
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Consider the results of broadening the concept of "authorization" to include 
situations in which governmental officials should be keeping the public away from a 
danger. What if the State were working on a road, but failed to cordon off an area where 
there was a dangerous hole? Under the trial court's interpretation of Section 301(5)(c), 
that would constitute a failure to revoke the authorization to use that section of the road. 
Or what if the State discovered a bomb in a government-owned building, but failed to 
evacuate the area? That would, under the trial court's view, constitute a failure to revoke 
the authorization to enter the government-owned building. The only sensible reading of 
Section 301(5)(c), therefore, is that it applies to situations where State approval is 
necessary to show that an individual is qualified to undertake a regulated activity. Any 
other interpretation of § 301(5)(c) would create an exception to the waiver of immunity 
that would threaten to swallow the rule, a reading of the Act the Court has rejected. 
Johnson v. Utah Dept. of Transp. 133 P.3d 402, 406 (Utah 2006) ("To do otherwise 
would allow the exception to swallow the rule"). 
While there are no cases directly on this issue, the two Utah Supreme Court cases 
on Section 301(5)(c) are consistent with this reading of the statute. In Gillman v. Dept. of 
Financial Institutions of the State of Utah, 782 P.2d 506 (1989), the trustee of a bankrupt 
thrift sued the state for failing to properly regulate the company. The Court held that the 
State was immune because the essence of the claim was a failure to revoke the thrift's 
license, which is a decision that requires the State to decide whether a company qualifies 
to participate in a regulated activity. 
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Similarly, in Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Commission, 175 P.3d 1042 
(2007), the plaintiff was the heir of a professional boxer who died during a boxing match. 
Plaintiff claimed that the State should not have issued a license to the boxer. To receive a 
license to box, there is a statute with specific qualifications, and the claim was that the 
decedent did not meet those qualifications. This claim, therefore, fell squarely within the 
scope of Section 301(5)(c). 
Placing Section 301(5)(c) in the broader context of the Act is also helpful. One 
theme running through many provisions is the distinction between discretionary policy 
making decisions, which are generally immune, and operational decisions, which are not. 
For example, in Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (1996), the plaintiff was injured 
in a river and alleged that the state negligently maintained a fence between the park and 
the river. The court ruled that the State was not immune because, having made the 
discretionary decision to erect a fence, which might be immune from suit under the Act, 
the State was under a duty to maintain it, which was "an operational decision" not 
protected by the Act. See also, Johnson v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 133 P.3d 402 (Utah 
2006) (decision to use orange barrels instead of a concrete barrier to keep motorists away 
from a construction zone not a policy decision protected by the Act). 
Here, the State enacted a regulation that required it to secure the closure of a 
campsite until a Level III bear has been destroyed. As the trial court noted, "the State did 
not follow this internal regulation...." (Add. 8) Having made the choice to adopt this 
regulation, this lawsuit challenges not a policy decision, but the operational conduct of 
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the State in failing to implement its own regulation. Section 301(5)(c), therefore, has no 
application to the facts of this case.4 
II. Section 301(5)(c) Of The Act Does Not Have Any 
Application To The Failure To Warn Theory Of Liability. 
One of Plaintiffs' theories of liability is that State was negligent because it left the 
campground "without placing any notices about the Level III nuisance Bear, or 
attempting to notify potential users of the campground of the imminent danger presented 
by the Level III bear." (R.000004) This failure to warn allegation is alone sufficient to 
support a negligence claim. Plaintiffs would never have used the campsite in question 
had any kind of warning been provided. Section 301(5)(c) has no application to this 
allegation because there is nothing that could be deemed a failure to "revoke" an 
"authorization." The allegation does not involve closing a campsite, but claims only that 
the State should have warned potential campers about the danger. 
The trial court ruled that this allegation was barred by Section 301(5)(c) because 
that provision applies "if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from" any 
of the enumerated exceptions. The trial court concluded that, even though a claim based 
on a failure to warn allegation would not be covered by the section, Plaintiffs' entire 
4
 The Federal Court reached a similar conclusion under the Federal Tort Claims Act: 
In the instant case, the bear that had earlier attacked campers at that very 
Campsite presented a "specific hazard, distinct from the multitude of 
hazards that might exists in a wilderness," Id., similar to the situation in 
Duke. It is difficult to conceive of what policy considerations could have 
been a play in failing to keep campers away from that Campsite while the 
bear was being tracked - or failing to at least warn campers about the 
situation. (Add. 29) 
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claim arose out of the alleged failure to revoke the authorization to use the campsite. 
This conclusion is not a correct application of the Act. 
Although contained in one Count, the Complaint alleges alternative factual bases 
for liability: Plaintiffs allege that the State should be liable for the failure to warn, or in 
the alternative, for the failure to cause the campsite to be closed. Either act was 
independently sufficient to prevent Plaintiffs' injury. The claim based on the State's 
failure to warn, therefore, "arise out o f or "result from" a failure to revoke an 
authorization. The fact that the State committed two negligent acts, one of which is 
potentially subject to immunity, should not affect an independent and alternative theory 
of liability that is not subject to immunity. 
Utah law specifically permits alternative pleading, even if one theory contradicts 
the other. For example, in Benjamin v. AMICA Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210 (Utah 
2006), the plaintiff pled a cause of action for both negligent and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The Court, citing Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a), held that even though the crux 
of a claim for negligent infliction of emotion distress was unintentional action, plaintiff 
could plead both that and a claim that the conduct was intentional. Id. at 1214. Here, 
Plaintiffs have pled alternative theories, one that the State was negligent for failing to 
secure the closure of the campground, and the other for failing to warn potential campers. 
It is useful, in this regard, to consider that Plaintiffs could have pled a complaint 
based solely on the failure to warn. There could be no argument, in that case, that the 
claim arose out of a failure to revoke an authorization. Why, then, should the outcome 
change because Plaintiffs included an alternative factual basis for liability? 
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The trial court relied on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Ogden 
City School District, 927 P.2d 159 (1996), which held that "arising out o f as used in the 
Act must be broadly interpreted and requires "only that there be come causal relationship 
between the injury and the risk" that is the subject of the statute.5 Nothing in this 
holding, however, precludes pleading alternative factual grounds for liability for the 
same injury, where one theory is covered by the immunity statute, and one theory is not. 
In Taylor, a child got into a fight at school and was injured when he was pushed 
through as a result of the fight. The plaintiffs alleged that the state negligently used 
unsafe glass, which caused the injury. The Act provides immunity for claims that "arise 
out o f an assault, and there was no question but that the plaintiff was the victim of the 
assault. Even though the negligent installation of glass standing alone might not be 
subject to an immunity provision, the court held that the claim "arose out o f a situation 
that was subject to statutory immunity - an assault. There were no alternative theories of 
liability involved. The complaint could not have been pleaded without mentioning the 
assault, because everything came about because of that. Taylor, therefore, stands for the 
proposition that if an injury arises out of a event that is subject to immunity - an assault -
you cannot create a viable claim by slicing out one aspect of the situation - the 
installation of dangerous glass - that is not subject to immunity. 
Here, in contrast, the failure to give notice did not "arise out o f the potentially 
immune event, the failure to close. The failure to warn is a complete and independent 
5
 The holding in Taylor was recently reaffirmed in Hoyer v. Utah, 2009 UT 38, 2009 WL 
1706511 (Utah 2009) 
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factual basis for liability. The complaint could have been pled without mentioning the 
alleged failure to cause the closure of the campsite. Under this alternative theory, 
Plaintiffs' injury arose out of the failure to give notice, and nothing else. The fact that 
there was a separate act of negligence - the failure to cause the campsite to be closed - is 
not analogous to Taylor. 
Under the rules allowing alternative pleading, therefore, Plaintiffs should, at a 
minimum, be permitted to proceed on the failure to warn claim. A claim based on that 
theory of causation did not arise out of or result from any failure to revoke an 
authorization to use the campsite and thus is not subject to Section 301(5)(c). 
III. Section 301(5)(c) Does Not Apply, Even If Closing 
The Campsite Would Have Involved A 
Revocation Of An " Authorization,59 Because 
It Was The Federal Government, Not The State, 
That Had The Power to Close the Campsite. 
The Federal government, not Utah, had the power to close the campsite. Under 
the State's black bear regulation, a Level III bear required the State to request that land 
management agencies close the campground. (Add. 7-8). The applicable land 
management agency in this case was the Federal government, because the land was 
Federal land. (R.000044) That is why the Complaint does not allege a failure to close 
the campsite, but rather a failure by the State to request that Federal agents do so. 
(R.000004) Although the trial court thought Plaintiffs alleged that the State negligently 
failed to close the campsite (Add. 4), this is not in fact what is alleged. 
The fact that the State's alleged negligence was a failure to get the Federal 
government to close the campsite raises a novel question under the Act. If one assumes 
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that this case arises solely out of a failure to revoke an authorization, it would be the 
Federal government that failed to revoke the authorization. The negligence by the State 
is the failure to request that the Federal government take certain action. The State itself 
was not in a position to revoke an authorization (assuming closing the campground 
involved revoking an authorization). 
The question, then, is whether Section 301(5)(c) applies to such a situation. 
Section 301(5)(c) states that immunity is not waived if the claim arises out of the 
"issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, of by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, 
suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization." The statute does not specify whether it refers to Utah ys issuance of, or 
failure to revoke, an authorization, or whether it includes any entity's (including the 
Federal government) issuance of, or failure to revoke, an authorization. The section 
would only be applicable to this case if the Act applies to claims that arise out of the 
federal government's issuance of or failure to revoke an authorization. This, however, is 
not a sensible reading of the statute. 
Although we have not found a case dealing with this specific issue, this provision 
of the Act is logically concerned only with precluding lawsuits challenging a certain type 
of action by the State of Utah. The provision on issuing "authorizations" comes from a 
laundry list of activities for which the State is immune from lawsuits, including anything 
arising out of the failure to make an inspection (§ 301(5)(d)), the institution of judicial or 
administrative proceedings (§ 301(5)(e)), and the collection of taxes (§ 301(5)(h)). 
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It doesn't make sense for the State of Utah to have immunity for cases arising out 
of Colorado's failure to collect taxes, or the Canadian government's failure to inspect. 
Under the interpretation suggested by the State, the statute would create immunity for all 
kinds of actions by persons and entities unrelated to the State. The more sensible reading 
of the statute is that it lists certain kinds of activities by the State of Utah that should be 
immune from suit. Thus, the State should be immune from suit for claims arising out it 
Utah's failure to revoke an "authorization," not the failure of any entity, anywhere in the 
world, to revoke an "authorization." 
This case provides perhaps the best illustration of the problem inherent in applying 
Section 301(5)(c) to a failure by the Federal government to revoke an authorization. The 
Federal Court has ruled that the Federal Government is not immune for that conduct 
(Add. 11-30), and it surely makes no sense for Utah to be immune based on a Federal 
failure to act, when the Federal government itself is not immune for that failure to act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reason stated in this Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully request that 
the Court reverse the trial court's ruling granting defendants' Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings and remand this case for further proceedings. 
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Fourth Judicial District Co-:'^  
cl Utah County, State of UlLn 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KEVAN FRANCIS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants 
RULING 
Date: January 29, 2009 
Case No.: 080401029 
Judge: Gary D. Stott 
This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Motion") 
filed by Defendants State of Utah, the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, and John Does 1-X 
("State"). 
Kevan Francis and other relatives of the late Samuel Ives ("Plaintiffs") filed a Complaint 
against the State on March 28, 2008, alleging negligence causing the wrongful death of the 
deceased, an 11-year-old boy killed by a black bear in American Fork Canyon on June 17, 2008. 
In its Amended Answer of April 24, 2008, the State asserted immunity from suit, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated section 63G-7-301. The State also filed this Motion on June 23, 2008. Plaintiffs 
responded (with the Court's permission for an extension of time) on July 21, 2008, with an 
opposition memorandum. The State replied on August 11, 2008, then filed a Request for Oral 
Arguments on August 12,2008. Counsel for both sides came to the Court on January 13,2009, and 
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argued the Motion. Having heard the arguments and read the memoranda provided by both parties, 
the Court rules on the Motion as follows. 
Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that any party may move for a 
judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed and within such time as to not delay trial. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c). UA court may enter judgment on the pleadings when the moving party 
is entitled to judgment on the face of the pleadings themselves." See Mountain America Credit 
Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 591 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). A judgment on the pleadings, which 
effectively amounts to a dismissal, is proper "only if, as a matter of law, the nonmoving party . . . 
could not prevail on the facts alleged." Id. Further, a court should "accept the factual allegations 
in the complaint as true, and consider them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, f^ 2. 
The State's Motion is based on governmental immunity. "Immunity is an affirmative 
defense which must be proved by the defendant." Nelson ex rel Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 
P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996). A governmental immunity analysis is typically preceded by a 
liability/negligence analysis. See Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1163-1164 
(Utah 1993); see also Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Utah 1991). However, the State 
admitted negligence for the purposes of its Motion, so this Court does not need to analyze duty and 
breach. See Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, }^ 12. Therefore, the Court analyzes whether or not the 
State is entitled to governmental immunity. 
A governmenta 1 immunity analysis requires three steps:"(1) whether the activity undertaken 
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is a governmental function; (2) whether governmental immunity was waived for the particular 
activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to that waiver." Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, ^[10. 
First, a governmental function is broadly defined as any "activity, undertaking, or operation 
of a governmental entity." U.C.A. § 63G-7-102(4)(a). It also "includes a governmental entity's 
failure to act." Id. § 63G-7-102(4)(c). Operating a camp site, as well as the corresponding duties 
concerning responses to nuisance bears, fall under the ambit of governmental function. At the time 
of argument, neither party contended that the State was not performing a government function. 
Second, immunity is generally waived for negligent conduct committed within the scope of 
the government worker's employment. See id. § 63G-7-301(4). For the purposes of its Motion, the 
State conceded negligence. 
Third, governmental immunity is not waived if there is a statutory exception to immunity. 
Here, the State alleges that a specific provision of U.C.A. § 63G-7-301(5) applies, which reads: 
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under Subsections (3) 
and (4) if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from:... (c) the 
issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, 
deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or 
similar authorization . . . 
Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis added). 
The State argues that the injury, Samuel Ives's death, arose out of or in connection with the 
State's failure to revoke the permit or authorization to camp in the danger area. That is, had the 
State revoked its permission to allow Plaintiffs' to camp in the site, the bear attack would not have 
happened and the injury would not have occurred. Further, the statute is plain and unambiguous, 
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and an immunity waiver exception should not be qualified without "textual justification." Moss v. 
Pete Suazo Athletic Comm 'n9 2007 UT 99, ^  13. The State contends that the broad language of the 
statute allows immunity whenever the injury arises out of or in connection with the failure to revoke 
authorization, meaning that there only need be "some causal nexus" between the injury and the 
failure. See Blackner, 2002 UT at ^ 15. The injury had at least some causal relation to the State's 
failure to revoke its camping authorization to Plaintiffs. Thus, through this exception to the 
immunity waiver, Plaintiffs' suit must be dismissed. 
Plaintiffs argue that the Complaint alleges many acts of negligence other than simply failing 
to close or restrict the campground. Further, strict application of the waiver exception in this case 
would be inappropriate and frustrate the purposes of the immunity statute. Plaintiffs argue that such 
an expansive application here would cause the exception to swallow the rule, and this was certainly 
not what the Legislature intended. Specifically, section 63G-7-301(5)(c) refers to deliberative, 
regulatory acts in which immunity from lawsuits affords the government wide latitude to engage in 
policy-making decisions. For example, a boxer's death following the Pete Suazo Utah Athletic 
Commission's negligent decision to allow him to compete was held to result from an approval or 
similar authorization permitting the boxer to fight; thus, immunity applied. See Mossf 2007 UT 99 
at T| 29. However, in emergent situations, such as when a dangerous bear is at large, the statute was 
not intended to immunize the government for its failure to remove attractants or warn the public. 
Plaintiffs argue that because the State's own regulations require its employees to take certain steps 
upon discovery of a nuisance bear, then there is no discretion or deliberation involved. Rather, the 
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employees must follow the rules in handling dangerous bears to avoid harm to others. Plaintiffs 
argue that handling a nuisance bear is similar to re-installing a downed stop sign. It is mandatory 
and not discretionary, therefore a government cannot be immune for injuries resulting from its 
employees' failure to put the stop sign back in its place. See, e.g., Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 
279 (Utah 1985) (holding that "the maintenance and repair of traffic signs is a governmental 
function for which immunity from suit has been expressly waived and which is not within the 
discretionary function exception.") However, the decision whether to put a stop sign in a particular 
place is purely discretionary. Thus, the government is immune from suit if injuries arose from the 
government's failure to place a stop sign at a dangerous intersection. SeeU.C.A. § 63G-7-301(5)(a). 
Similarly, the State's decisions once it was on notice of a dangerous bear are not discretionary, but 
mandatory. Therefore, the State cannot rely on a statute that pertains to licensing and other types 
of decisions to be immune from suit. 
Neither party fully argued the discretionary function exception, which allows the state to 
retain immunity if the injury arose out of the exercise or failure to exercise a discretionary function. 
SeeU.C.A. § 63G-7-301(5)(a). Presumably, this is because section 63G-7-301(5)(c) is more directly 
applicable to the case. For that matter, the fact that the first provision of the immunity exception 
statute, section 63G-7-301(5)(a), restores governmental immunity based on the performance or 
failure to perform any discretionary function means that the discretionary function issue is irrelevant 
to the other provisions in the same statute, as any of those statutory exemptions are independently 
sufficient for the State to have immunity. In other words, if the State proves that it has immunity 
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based on section 63G-7-301(5)(c), then it does not need to even delve into the question of whether 
the injury arose from the exercise of a discretionary function. In arguing against the application of 
Subsection 301 (5)(c), Plaintiffs characterized it as relating only to deliberative functions, stating that 
in emergent situations the provision is inapplicable. However, Plaintiffs have pointed to no cases 
showing that regarding non-deliberative decisions or emergent situations, the immunity waiver 
exception found in Subsection 301(5)(c) does not apply. Thus, this Court is constrained to apply 
the exception as written, and as it has been interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court. This Court 
hesitates to "place a condition on the applicability of the exception without any textual justification." 
Moss, 2007 UT 99 at H 13. 
The Utah Supreme Court clarified the breadth of the causation requirement built into the 
waiver exception provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in Taylor ex rel Taylor v. 
Ogden School District, 927 P.2d 159, 164 (Utah 1996). Taylor, a mother, sued on behalf of her son 
Zachary after he was pushed into an allegedly unsafe window at a state-owned school. Id. at 159-
160. The broken glass damaged nerves and tendons in Zachary's hand. Id. at 160. Taylor argued 
that Zachary's injuries "arose out o f the defendant's negligent failure to install safety plate glass 
in the school. Id. at 161. The defendant argued that the injuries "arose out o f an assault and 
battery, thus rendering the state immune under U.C.A. § 63-30-10(2). The Utah Supreme Court 
found the phrase "arising out o f to be "very broad, general and comprehensive." Id. at 163. That 
is, there only need be "some causal relationship between the injury and the risk [provided for]." Id. 
The court continued: 
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Taylor maintains that the assault exception should not apply because Zachary's 
injuries have a greater link to the dangerous window in the restroom than to 
Trenton's assault. However, "arises out o f within the assault exception '"is a phrase 
of much broader significance than "caused by.'"" National Farmers Union 
[Property & Cas. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co.], 577 P.2d [961] at 963 [(Utah 
1978)] (quoting Hartford Accident & Indent. Co. v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 
33 Cal. App. 3d 26, 108 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (Ct. App. 1973)). Under the phrase's 
ordinary meaning, the assault need not be the sole cause of the injury to except the 
governmental entity from liability for the injury. See id. The language demands 
'"only that there be some causal relationship between the injury and the risk'" 
provided for. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lawver, 238 N.W.2d at 518). In this 
case, there is undoubtedly "some" causal relationship between Zachary's injury and 
Trenton's assault upon him. 
Id. 
Although Taylor discussed the "arose out o f phrase as it relates to assault, the phrase is 
found in the provision heading to all 21 immunity waiver exceptions found in section 63G-7-301(5). 
Thus, this Court inteiprets it in Section 301(5)(c) in the same manner as the Utah Supreme Court 
interpreted it in Section 301(5)(b). In the instant case, Plaintiffs have alleged other possible causes 
of injury, such as the negligent failure to notify potential campers or the negligent failure to remove 
attractants. Certainly, the injury derives from these causes just as much as it does from the 
government's failure to revoke camping authorization. But the immune situation need not be the 
sole cause of injury, nor is the government required to prove more than "some" causal link to the 
immune situation. 
The State's policy on handling black bear incidents contains this rule of procedure: 
Division employees should request that land management agencies close or restrict 
the use of campgrounds where nuisance black bears are active until the source of the 
problem (attractant) has been removed and/or the offending bear has been removed. 
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State of Utah Division of Wildlife Resources Administration, Handling Black Bear 
Incidents 7, No. W5WLD-3 (June 9, 2005). 
Although Plaintiffs are correct that the State did not follow this internal regulation, the 
State's own negligence in disregarding necessary safeguards is irrelevant. Indeed, the Moss court 
found the Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Commission immune under section § 63-30-10(3)' despite its 
failure to follow at least five of its own safety rules. See Moss, 2007 UT 44 at ffif 3-6. Further, the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act "immunizes many governmental acts or omissions that impact 
life and safety." Id. at ^ 13; See, e.g., U.C.A. § 63G-7-301(5)(b) (assault and battery); id § 63G-7-
301(5)(g) (riots, mob violence, and civil disturbances); id. § 63G-7-301(5)(s) (emergency medical 
assistance, fire fighting, and regulating hazardous materials). 
The Utah Supreme Court also noted in Taylor that sovereign immunity even applied where 
a plaintiffs injuries arose out of an assault by a non-go vemment assailant. See Taylor, 927 P.2d at 
164. The court stated that "[t]he Act and [the Utah Supreme Court's] prior decisions demand that 
the act be strictly applied to preserve sovereign immunity." Id. Hence, this Court strictly applies 
the Act. 
This Court observes that sovereign immunity cases often seem unfair to plaintiffs who have 
suffered wrongs which could otherwise be righted against private parties. The Utah Supreme Court 
recognized this as well, in a case in which a school district was immunized from a suit arising out 
of the vicious beating of one of its students. See Ledfors v. Emeiy County Sch. DisL, 849 P. 2d 1162, 
1
 This statute is identical to U.C.A. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (2008). 
Page 8 of 10 A r> 
1162-63 (Utah 1993). The Supreme Court concluded its decision with this paragraph: 
In reaching this decision, we are sympathetic to Richie's plight. It is unfortunate that 
any parent who is required by state law to send his or her child to school lacks a civil 
remedy against negligent school personnel who fail to assure the child's safety at 
school. Nevertheless, the legislature has spoken with clarity on the question of 
immunity, and we are constrained by the plain language of the Act and our prior case 
law on this point. However, as we stated in O 'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 
"Certainly, the legislature is not so constrained as we." 821 P.2d 1139, 1145 (Utah 
1991). It is entirely within the legislature's power to permit all plaintiffs to whom 
the government owes a duty of care based on a special relationship to bring suit for 
injuries arising out of a breach of that duty. Or the legislature could tailor the waiver 
of immunity more narrowly; the state could permit suit by or on behalf of public 
school children injured as a result of such a breach of duty. Its power to craft 
waivers of immunity is far superior to ours. 
Id. at 1167. 
As in Ledfors, this Court sympathizes with Plaintiffs' heartbreaking situation. But, it is not 
within the authority of this Court to craft exceptions to exceptions on which the Legislature has 
spoken plainly and the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted broadly. True, the Legislature probably 
did not foresee that section 63G-7-301(5)(c) would one day be applied in a bizarre case involving 
a tragic bear attack. Nevertheless, this Court is "constrained by the plain language of the Act." And 
the relevant provision of the Act simply states that if the injury complained of arises out of or is 
connected with a failure to revoke a permit, approval or similar authorization, then the State is 
immune. 
The State failed to revoke authorization for Plaintiffs to camp at their chosen site. Samuel 
Ives was killed by the bear at that camp site where, this Court assumes, Plaintiffs would not have 
camped had the State revoked authorization. Thus, the State is immune from any action based on 
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the injuries. 
Therefore, the State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted. Counsel for the 
Defendants shall prepare the appropriate order and submit it for this Court's signature. 
Dated th is hy day 
Judge Gary D[ Sftot 
Fourth JudiciaM)istrict^ 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
KEVAN FRANCIS and REBECCA 
IVES, Individually, the Natural Parents 
of S.L, Deceased; TIM MULVEY and 
REBECCA IVES, Individually and on 
Behalf of their Minor Child, J.M., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, USDA 
FOREST SERVICE, and JOHN DOES I-
X, 
Defendants. 
This matter is before the court on the United States of America's Motion to Dismiss. A 
hearing on the motion was held on November 19, 2008. At the hearing, the United States was 
represented by Amy J. Oliver and Jeffrey E. Nelson. Plaintiffs were represented by Allen K. 
Young, Tyler S. Young, and Sarah H. Young. Before the hearing, the court carefully considered 
the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the motion under 
advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts relating to the motion. Now being 
fully advised, the court renders the following Memorandum Decision and Order. 
4-'l 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 2:08cv244DAK 
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INTRODUCTION 
At issue in the instant motion is whether the United States is immune from suit for 
its alleged role in failing to prevent a tragic and fatal bear attack of a minor boy, S.L, who 
was camping in American Fork Canyon with his family during the night of June 17, 2007. 
In the early morning hours of June 17, 2007, another camper, Jake Francom, had 
reported an aggressive bear at the very campsite at which Si 's family later stayed. Based 
on Mr. Francom's report, state and federal officials determined that the bear was a Level 
III—the most dangerous level-nuisance bear that had to be found and destroyed. They 
searched for the bear with hounds but called off the search late in the afternoon. 
Unfortunately, no further actions were taken, and the campground and specific campsite 
remained open. No one posted notices about the Level III bear, nor did anyone attempt 
to notify potential users of the campsite regarding the imminent danger presented by the 
bear. Around 6:00 p.m., Plaintiffs, along with S.L, arrived at the same campsite to camp 
for the night. Tragically, the bear returned sometime before midnight, ripped the tent in 
which S.L was sleeping, and pulled S.L out of the tent, fatally wounding him. On the 
following day, the bear was located and euthanized. 
Plaintiffs, who are S.L's parents, have asserted a negligence claim based on the 
government's failure to close the campsite or provide some type of warning. In this 
motion, the United States argues that Plaintiffs' negligence claim must be dismissed 
Case 208-CV-00244-DAK Document 21 Filed 01/30/2009 Page 3 of 20 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because, it contends, the action is 
barred by the "discretionary function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act 
("FTCA"), and therefore the United States is immune from suit. Plaintiffs, however, 
disagree that the government's actions were protected by the discretionary function 
exception of the FTCA because no decision was actually made and no policy 
considerations were at issue in making-or failing to make-a decision about warning 
potential campers of this specific, known risk. The court agrees with Plaintiffs that, 
given the specific facts of this case, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA 
does not shield the United States from suit in this action, and therefore, the United States' 
motion to dismiss is denied. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 
A. The Camping Area at Issue 
The Timpooneke Campground (the "Campground") is located in a mountainous 
area next to the Mt. Timpanogos Wilderness Area in American Fork Canyon, within the 
Uinta National Forest (the "Forest"). It provides many services, including fire rings, 
grills, picnic tables, restrooms, and water. The fee for a single campsite in 2007 was 
1
 The parties agree that because this is a factual attack on the sufficiency of the 
jurisdictional averments, the court may look beyond the allegations in the Complaint, and 
it has wide discretion to allow documentary and testimonial evidence under Rule 
12(b)(1). Paper, Allied Indus., Chem, & Energy Workers Intern'I Union v. Continental 
Carbon Co.. 428 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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$13.00. 
"Dispersed camping" is also allowed in the Forest. Dispersed camping is the term 
used for camping anywhere in the Forest that is outside of a developed campground. 
Dispersed campsites have no toilets, no treated water, and no fire pits or fire grates. There 
is no fee involved with camping in a dispersed site. Such areas exist because many 
people enjoy the solitude and primitive experience of camping away from developed 
campgrounds and other campers. 
Signs warning that Utah is bear country are located throughout the Forest. One 
such sign was located on the bulletin board at the Tank Canyon pull-out on the road up 
American Fork Canyon toward the Timpooneke Campground. The sign provides 
guidelines concerning bears that people should follow while in the Forest. Another 
general warning sign was located at the entrance to the Timpooneke Campground. 
Additional warnings about bears are contained on the Forest website. 
B. The Events of June 17, 2007 
On June 17, 2007, the Utah County Sheriffs Office Dispatch received a call from 
Jake Francom, who reported that he had encountered a bear earlier that morning-at 
approximately 5:30 a.m.-while camping in a dispersed campsite (the "Campsite") in an 
area above Mutual Dell in American Fork Canyon. Mr. Francom reported that the bear 
"stomped" on one person's head, hit a camper at least twice, and then sliced into the side 
of a tent and put a paw through a camper's pillow. The bear had also damaged his 
/ \ -n 
Case 2:08-cv-00244-DAK Document 21 Filed 01/30/2009 Page 5 of 20 
cooler. He and his friends were able to scare the bear away. 
The dispatcher stated that both the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (the "Utah 
DWR") and federal Forest Service officials would be contacted. Thus, both the federal 
and state authorities were quickly notified of this incident. By no later than 10:13 a.m., 
an official from the federal Wildlife Specialist of the USDA was fully informed of the 
situation and had agreed to jointly deal with state officials in addressing the problem. 
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the USDA Forest 
Service, Intermountain Region, and the Utah DWR, the Utah DWR made the decision 
that day to classify the bear reported by Mr. Francom as a "Level III nuisance bear," 
which is the most dangerous category, and a Level III bear incident is considered to 
present "a threat to public safety." Pursuant to Utah State policy regarding the handling 
of black bears, the Utah DWR then proceeded to search for the bear in order to destroy it. 
The bear was pursued by two individuals-one from Utah DWR and a United States 
Wildlife Specialist, who brought dogs to help track the bear. The bear was tracked for 
approximately four and a half hours, but without success. The trackers decided at that 
point to resume the search the next day. No action was taken to close or restrict access to 
the Campsite or to warn prospective users of the Campsite. The federal Forest Supervisor 
stated after the attack that "he is the only person who can close a campground and was not 
given the opportunity to make that call." 
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on June 17, 2007, Plaintiffs arrived at the 
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Timpooneke Campground, intending to camp there. They stopped at the designated 
United States Forest Service ranger booth and pay station. They paid the fee required to 
travel and camp in the Forest area. Plaintiffs, however, did not have cash to pay the 
additional $13.00 fee charged for camping within the Timpooneke Campground. 
Consequently, Plaintiffs left the Campground in search of a campsite above the 
Timpooneke Campground, for which there was no additional fee. 
At the ranger booth and pay station, no one mentioned anything about the bear 
attack earlier that morning. On their way to the campsite, Plaintiffs passed a DWR pick-
up truck with two occupants who waived at Plaintiffs, but they did not provide any 
information about the bear attack. After Plaintiffs pitched their tent, they cleaned up 
cans, wrappers, and other garbage left by previous campers, and then they put all of their 
coolers in their locked car and went to bed around 9:00 p.m. 
Although the Campsite is not a formally developed campground, it is a well-
established tent campsite. It is located right beside Forest Service Road 056, and it has an 
established fire pit, a place to park a car, and a flat area for pitching a tent. When 
Plaintiffs arrived, there was also cut and stacked kindling wood and logs for seating. The 
only way to access the Campsite is by driving first to the Timpooneke Campground, past 
a Forest Service booth at the entrance to that campground, and then continuing on Forest 
Service Road 056, which is a dirt road at that point. It is a dead-end road, and there is a 
gate at the entrance to the section just as one leaves the Timpooneke Campground. If the 
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gate is closed, there is no access to the Campsite. The Campsite is located about one 
mile beyond the Timpooneke Campgiound, and it is the first available campsite aftei the 
Timpooneke Campground. 
The existence of the Campsite was known to federal officials. An employee of the 
Forest Service concessionaire that manages the Timpooneke Campground stated that 
when he spoke with Plaintiffs' camping party, they asked whether they could use the 
Campsite, and he responded that it was "open." 
Later that night, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Plaintiff Tim Mulvey contacted Mr. 
Sheely, the campground manager at the Timpooneke Campground, and reported that 
someone had cut open their tent and taken his stepson, S.I. Mr. Sheely immediately 
drove to the Timpanogos Cave National Monument to call the Utah County Dispatch to 
report the incident. S.I was later found deceased, and it was apparent that his injuries 
were consistent with a bear attack. The bear believed to be responsible for the death of 
S.I. was tracked and killed on June 18, 2007. 
C. Relevant Statutes, Regulations, and Policies of the Forest Service 
Federal statute establishes that the "national forests are established and shall be 
administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish 
purposes." 16 U.S.C. § 528. The Secretary of Agriculture is "directed to develop and 
administer the renewable surface forests for multiple use." 16 U.S.C. § 529. Forest 
Service regulations establish that the "overall goal of managing the N[ational] F[orest] 
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Sfystem] is to sustain the multiple uses of its renewable resources in perpetuity while 
maintaining the long-term productivity of the land. Resources are to be managed so they 
are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people." 36 
C.F.R. § 219.1(b). Forest Service regulations further provide that in the context of 
wildlife management, the Forest Service "may enter into such general or specific 
cooperative agreements with appropriate State officials" to secure and maintain "desirable 
populations of wildlife species." 36 C.F.R. § 241.2. 
Title 2300 of the Forest Service Manual ("FSM") sets forth the guidelines for 
"Recreation, Wilderness, and Related Resource Management." Section 2302 of the FSM 
identifies the "OBJECTIVES" to be achieved by managing recreation and wilderness as: 
1. To provide nonurbanized outdoor recreation opportunities in natural 
appearing forest and rangeland settings. 
2. To protect the long-term public interest by maintaining and enhancing 
open space options, public accessibility, and cultural, wilderness, visual, 
and natural resource values 
3. To promote public transportation and/or access to National Forest 
recreation opportunities. 
4. To shift land ownership patterns as necessary to place urbanized recreation 
settings into other ownerships to create more public open space and/or 
natural resource recreation values. 
5. To provide recreation opportunities and activities that: 
a. Encourage the study and enjoyment of nature; 
b. Highlight the importance of conservation; 
c. Provide scenic and visual enjoyment; and 
d. Instill appreciation of the nation's history, cultural resources, and 
traditional values. 
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In addition, Section 2330 of the FSM governs "Publicly Managed Recieation 
Oppoitunities " Section 2330.2 of the FSM identifies the Objective of developing and 
managing Foicst Scivice recieation sites and facilities as follows 
1 To maximize opportunities for visitors to know and experience nature 
while engaging m outdoor recreation 
2. To develop and manage sites consistent with the available natural 
resources to provide a safe, healthful, esthetic, non-urban atmospheie. 
3. To provide a maximum contrast with urbanization at National Forest 
System sites. 
Section 2332, which governs Public Safety at developed recreation sites, provides: 
To the extent practicable, eliminate safety hazards from developed 
recreation sites. Inspect each public recreation site annually before 
the beginning of the managed-use season. Maintain a record of the 
inspections and corrective actions taken with a copy of the operation and 
maintenance plan. 
Immediately correct high-priority hazards that develop or are 
identified during the operating season or close the site. 
FSM 2300, Chapter 2330 identifies only two types of hazards: tree hazards (2332.11) and 
other natural hazards. With regard to other natural hazards at developed recreation sites, 
the FSM provides the following: 
If practicable, correct known natural hazards when a site is 
developed and open for public use. If the hazards remain or new 
natural hazards are identified, take steps to protect the public from 
the hazards. Tailor the action taken to each hazardous situation. 
Consider posting signs, installing barriers, or, if necessary, closing 
the site to address concerns of public safety. 
k-\<\ 
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II. DISCUSSION 
It is well settled that the United States, as a sovereign entity, "is immune from suit 
save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court 
define that court's jurisdiction to entertain that suit." Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 
160(1981) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,399(1976)). Thus, suit 
against the United States can be entertained only when Congress has specifically waived 
the United States' immunity. See id. Furthermore, such waiver of sovereign immunity 
cannot be implied; it must be unequivocally expressed. See Franconia Assocs. v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 129, 141 (2002). 
The FTCA is a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity. The 
FTCA's waiver of immunity is limited to causes of action against the United States 
arising out of certain torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of 
their employment. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976). Because the 
FTCA is only a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity, it is subject to a 
number of exceptions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2680; Orleans, 425 U.S. at 
813. These exceptions are to be "strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be 
implied." Lehman, 453 U.S. at 160 (quoting Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 
(1957)). 
One of the exceptions to the jurisdiction granted by the FTCA is the "discretionary 
function exception," 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao 
Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 809 (1984). The burden is on 
A - ; o 
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Plaintiffs to prove that their claims are not based upon actions immunized from liability 
under the discretionary function exception. See Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172, 
1176 (10th Cir. 2002). The discretionary function exception precludes the imposition of 
liability against the United States for conduct "based upon the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
agency or employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be 
abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). This exception "marks the boundary between Congress' 
willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain 
governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals." Elder, 312 F.3d at 
1176 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The exception applies regardless of 
whether the government agent was negligent in his duties, so long as his duties were 
discretionary. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32 (1953); Lopez v. United 
States, 376 F.3d 1055, 1057 (10th Cir. 2004). 
Analysis of the discretionary function exception is a threshold jurisdictional issue, 
and "it is irrelevant whether the government employees were negligent." Elder, 312 F.3d 
at 1176. Because the waiver of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, the court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that falls within the discretionary function 
exception. Aragon v. United States, 146 F.3d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1998). To determine 
the applicability of the discretionary function exception, courts employ a two-part test. 
See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991); Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-
37; Elder, 312 F.3d at 1176. First, a court must determine whether the challenged 
11 A ^ I 
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conduct at issue involved a matter of judgment or choice. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 
The discretionary function exception does not apply if a "federal statute, regulation, or 
policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow" and "the 
employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive." Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322. 
The standards set forth by federal statute, regulation, or policy will bar the application of 
the discretionary function exception only if such standards are "both specific and 
mandatory." Aragon, 146 F.3d at 823. It is the nature of the conduct that is at issue, not 
whether the conduct may have been negligent. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 3 2 1 . 
Second, if the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, a court must 
next "determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function 
exception was designed to shield." Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. The discretionary 
function exception "protects only governmental actions and decisions based on 
considerations of policy." Id. Congress specifically enacted the discretionary function 
exception " ' to prevent judicial "second-guessing" of legislative and administrative 
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an 
action in tort. '" Id. at 537 (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814) (emphasis added). 
"When established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, 
regulation or agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must 
be presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion." 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. To avoid dismissal, Plaintiffs "must allege facts which would 
support a finding that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said 
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to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime." Id. at 324-25. "The focus of the 
inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by 
statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are 
susceptible to policy analysis." Id. at 325. 
In this case, the parties do not disagree as to the law, but as to whether the actions 
at issue in this case were discretionary under the two prongs of the above-mentioned test, 
commonly referred to as the "Berkovitz test." In short, the United States claims that both 
prongs of the Berkovitz test have been satisfied, and thus, that its decision was 
discretionary. Consequently, it argues that the United States is immune from suit, and 
this action must be dismissed. 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim that the United States cannot satisfy either 
prong of Berkovitz. First, they claim that there was a specific policy applicable to the 
actions of the United States, and thus, no discretion was involved. Second, they claim 
that even if there was discretion involved, the failure to close the Campsite or otherwise 
keep campers from using the Campsite until the bear was destroyed did not involve the 
type of public policy decision that is protected by the discretionary function doctrine. 
A. First Prong of Berkovitz: 
To prevail on the first prong, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the challenged 
decisions involved "no 'element of judgment or choice. '" Elder, 312 F.3d at 1176-77 
(quoting Kiehn v. United States, 984 F.2d 1100, 1102 (10th Cir. 1993)). To do so, they 
must show that Forest Service "employees violated a federal statute, regulation, or policy 
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that is both 'specific and mandatory.'" Id. at 1177 (quoting Aragon, 146 F.3d at 823). 
Plaintiffs argue that Utah has an extensive regulation (the "Regulation") describing 
what to do when there is a nuisance bear at large: 
Division employees should request that land management agencies close or restrict 
the use of campgrounds where nuisance black bears are active until the source of 
the problem (attractant) has been removed and/or the offending bear has been 
removed. 
Plaintiffs, thus, claim that both state and federal authorities failed to implement the part 
that required keeping attractants -campers and their food -away from the Campsite until 
the bear had been destroyed. In light of the word "should," however, the court cannot 
conclude that this Regulation mandates a specific course of action. 
Plaintiffs also claim that a Forest Service policy independently establishes that, at a 
minimum, the Forest Service was required to post warning signs after the first bear attack 
at the Campsite. Specifically, the Forest Service Manual provides: 
If practicable, correct known natural hazards when a site is developed and 
open for public use. If the hazards remain or new natural hazards are 
identified, take steps to protect the public from the hazards. Tailor the 
action taken to each hazardous situation. Consider posting signs, installing 
barriers, or, if necessary, closing the site to address concerns of public 
safety. 
The court, however, cannot conclude that this policy sets forth a mandatory course of 
action that should have been followed in this case.2 The court finds that there is no 
statute, regulation, or agency policy mandating the precise manner in which the United 
2
 The Government points out that "determining what is practicable requires the 
exercise of discretion." Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir. 1997). 
14 A , -yi\ 
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States should have managed this situation This determination, however, does not end the 
court's inquiry Plaintiffs may still establish that the United States' actions are not 
piotected by the discretionary function exception if, under the second Beikovitz prong, 
Plaintiffs can demonstrate that the challenged conduct was not the type of conduct that 
the discietionary function exception was designed to shield, as more fully explained 
below 
B Second Prong ofBerkovitz 
To prevail on the second prong of Berkovitz and avoid dismissal, Plaintiffs "must 
allege facts [that] would support a finding that the challenged actions are not the kind of 
conduct that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime " Gaubert, 
499 U S at 324-25 According to the United States, "it must be presumed that the agent's 
acts are grounded m policy when exercising that discretion " Gaubert, 499 U S at 324 
The Government argues that Plaintiffs cannot overcome this presumption 
The United States also cites to cases from numerous courts, including the Tenth 
Circuit and this court, which, the Government claims, have found similar decisions to fall 
withm the discretionary function exception For example, in Gadd v United States, 971 
F Supp 502, 509 (D Utah 1997), this couit found that the decision not to warn of black 
bears involved "balancing of considerations of resource management and safety along 
with how best to handle safety concerns when absolute safety is not possible " 
Similarly, the United States relies on Eldei v United States, 312 F 3d at 1181-84 (10th 
Cir 2002), in which the couit granted immunity under the discretionary function test, 
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finding that a decision not to provide additional warnings required the National Park 
Service to balance safety, access, cost, preservation of natural resources and aesthetic 
values, and the likely benefit of additional signage, and thus was protected. 
These cases, however, are distinguishable from the case at bar in that they did not 
involve an immediate, known risk, specific in time and location. For example, in Gadd, 
a camper was severely injured by a bear attack in a United States Forest. The plaintiff 
alleged that the injury was due to negligence in the government's management of that 
national forest. The court relied on the following facts: a black bear had never before 
been seen on the peninsula where the campground at issue was located; the peninsula was 
uninviting to bears and a poor quality bear habitat at best, in contrast to the area across the 
reservoir where ample cover and food sources existed; the only bear sighting ever in the 
larger area was across the reservoir, and that sighting was two years before the attack at 
issue; the offending bear had been killed, and there had been no more bear sightings. 
Accordingly, the court held that the decision whether to post warning signs would 
be discretionary "where a hazard such as bears is not a known natural hazard directly 
associated with a particular site." Id. Thus, the court agreed with the United States that 
Forest service decisions regarding the matters complained of in Gadd were "grounded in 
diverse public policies and involve balancing of considerations of resource management 
and safety along with how best to handle safety concerns when absolute safety is not 
possible." Id. at 509. 
No case cited by the United States addresses a situation similar to the instant case 
A-20? 
Case 2 08-cv-00244-DAK Document 21 Filed 01/30/2009 Page 17 of 20 
in which the handling of a very specific, immediate, known iisk was being considered, as 
opposed to a general iisk of lecreating in wilderness areas The facts involved in the 
cases cited by Plaintiffs aie much more similar to the instant case, lendermg their 
holdings to be moie pcisuasive - if not contiolling 
For example, in Smith v United States, 546 F 2d 872 (10th Cir 1976), a visitor to 
Yellowstone National Park was injured when he fell into a thermal pool The thermal 
pool m question was in an undeveloped area, in that it had no boardwalk or other 
amenities, but there was a parking area very close to it, and a well-worn path to the pool. 
The court held that the decision to leave the area undeveloped was discretionary, but that 
the decision to place no warning signs by the pool was not. Id. at 877 ("The 
Government's decision . . . not to warn of the known dangers or to provide safeguards 
cannot rationally be deemed the exercise of a discretionary function."). 
Also, m Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989), the government 
allowed both boating and swimming in a section of a lake, and a swimmer was killed by a 
passing boat. The court held the decision to zone that section of the lake to allow both 
boating and swimming was immunized by the discretionary function doctrine, but the 
decision to place no warnings of any kind for swimmers was not. Id. at 898. 
It is helpful to specifically compare two Tenth Circuit cases, the first pertaining to 
a generalized risk and the second to a specific risk. First, in Zumwalt v. United States, 
928 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1991), a hiker was injured when he left a marked trail and fell mto 
a cave. The Tenth Circuit held that the negligence claim was barred by the discretionary 
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function doctrine because "the absence of warning signs was part of the overall policy 
decision to maintain the Trail in its wilderness state." Id. at 955. 
In contrast, in Duke v. Department of Agriculture, 131 F.3d 1407 (10th Cir. 1997), 
a camper was injured when a boulder rolled down a hillside and smashed into his tent. 
The plaintiffs were camping near a dam. The construction of a state road had created a 
risk of boulders rolling down a particular hill. The plaintiffs were not in a developed 
campsite, but rather on the other side of the road from a developed campsite. In Duke, 
the Forest Service admitted that although there were no signs designating the spot for 
camping, camping had always been allowed there, as reflected in the fact that there was 
an existing fire ring. Id. at 1409-10. 
The Duke court ruled that the failure to provide any warning of this risk was not 
protected by the discretionary function doctrine because, in contrast to other failure-to-
warn cases, this situation involved a specific, known risk, and there were no public policy 
considerations at issue. Id. at 1411. The court contrasted the generalized risks of the 
wilderness and the public policy considerations that go into keeping an area pristine, with 
those cases in which the court had found that a failure to warn did not involve a public 
policy type of decision: 
In each of these cases the court could not perceive in the record before it 
any significant social, economic or political policy in the action or inaction 
that allegedly contributed to the injury giving rise to the lawsuit. In these 
cases a specific hazard existed, distinct from the multitude of hazards that 
might exist in, for example, a wilderness trial through a national park or 
forest, where warnings might detract from the area's character or safety 
structures might be costly. 
Id. 
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In the instant case, the bear that had earlier attacked campers at that very Campsite 
presented a "specific hazard, distinct from the multitude of hazards that might exist in . . . 
a wilderness," id., similar to the situation in Duke. It is difficult to conceive of what 
policy considerations could have been at play in failing to keep campers away from that 
Campsite while the bear was being tracked-or failing to at least warn campers about the 
situation. Moreover, the evidence set forth thus far in this litigation demonstrates, 
tragically, that no decision was ever actually made about how to handle this threat to 
public safety. The government official with the authority to close the Campsite stated that 
he was never given the opportunity to make that call. Plaintiffs contend, and the court 
agrees, that this was a simple and tragic failure to act, which does not fall under the 
discretionary function exception to the FTCA. 
Even if a decision had been made (i.e., to do nothing), such a decision is simply 
not susceptible to a policy analysis, and thus fails the second prong of the Berkovitz test. 
There was no significant social, economic, or political policy involved in failing to warn 
campers of the specific risk at issue here. "Decisions that require choice are exempt from 
suit under the FTCA only if they are "susceptible to policy judgment and involve an 
exercise of political, social, [or] economic judgment." Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325. As the 
Tenth Circuit has eloquently pointed out, the government can almost always argue 
that decisions-or nondecisions-that involve choice and any hint of policy 
concerns are discretionary and within the exception. We agree with the 
D.C. Circuit that "[tjhis approach . . . would not only eviscerate the second 
step of the analysis set out in Berkovitz and Gaubert, but it would allow the 
exception to swallow the FTCA's sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity." 
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Duke 131 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 448, 449 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995)). 
Here, there was known danger- specific in time and location. No policy judgment 
was involved, nor was there an exercise of political, social, or economic judgment. 
There might have been a different outcome to this motion had the earlier bear attack 
happened several miles away or several days or weeks before, but such a scenario is not 
before the court. In this case, United States officials knew that an aggressive bear had 
been present at the Campsite earlier that day-and those officials had decided that the bear 
was dangerous enough that it need to be tracked and euthanized. When the bear was not 
found tfrat afternoon, no other action was taken-and there is no evidence of any 
discussion about what might have been done. Tragically, S.I. and his family later set up 
camp at that very site. The court finds that the United States' failure to take any 
precautionary measures regarding the Level III bear, which was still on the loose, does 
not fall under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. Accordingly, the United 
States is not immune from suit, and its motion to dismiss is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the United States of America's Motion to 
Dismiss [docket #6] is DENIED. 
DATED this 30th day of January, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
DALE A. KIMBALL 
United States District Judge 
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Title 63G General Government 
Chapter 7 Governmental Immunity Act of Utah 
Section 301 Waivers of immunity -- Exceptions. 
63G-7-301. Waivers of immunity — Exceptions. 
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any contractual obligation. 
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations are not subject to the requirements of 
Sections 63G-7-401, 63G-7-402. 63G-7-403. or 63G-7-601. 
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from a reservoir or 
associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to 
deliver the contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition 
that causes a deficiency in the amount of available water. 
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived: 
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession of, or quiet title to real or personal property; 
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or other liens on real or personal property, to 
determine any adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an adjudication about any 
mortgage or other lien that the governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal property; 
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction, damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or 
other property while it is in the possession of any governmental entity or employee, if the property was 
seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of state law; 
(d) subject to Subsection 63G-7-302(l), as to any action brought under the authority of Article I, 
Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity 
when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just 
compensation; 
(e) subject to Subsection 63G-7-302(2), as to any action brought to recover attorney fees under 
Sections 63G-2-405 and 63G-2-802; 
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah Protection of Public Employees Act; or 
(g) as to any action brought to obtain relief from a land use regulation that imposes a substantial 
burden on the free exercise of religion under Title 63L, Chapter 5, Utah Religious Land Use Act. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
waived as to any injury caused by: 
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or 
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other 
public improvement. 
(b) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or 
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, 
or other public improvement. 
(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury proximately caused by 
a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
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employment. 
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the 
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse 
of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
violation of civil rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, 
suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or 
without probable cause; 
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional; 
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal 
confinement; 
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands; 
(1) any condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation; 
(m) any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the 
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands; 
(n) the operation or existence of a pedestrian or equestrian trail that is along a ditch, canal, stream, or 
river, regardless of ownership or operation of the ditch, canal, stream, or river, if: 
(i) the trail is designated under a general plan adopted by a municipality under Section 10-9a-401 or 
by a county under Section 17-27a-401: 
(ii) the trail right-of-way or the right-of-way where the trail is located is open to public use as 
evidenced by a written agreement between the owner or operator of the trail right-of-way, or of the 
right-of-way where the trail is located, and the municipality or county where the trail is located; and 
(iii) the written agreement: 
(A) contains a plan for operation and maintenance of the trail; and 
(B) provides that an owner or operator of the trail right-of-way or of the right-of-way where the trail 
is located has, at minimum, the same level of immunity from suit as the governmental entity in 
connection with or resulting from the use of the trail. 
(o) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(p) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
(q) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(r) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements of 
Section 41-6a-212; 
(s) the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes; 
(iv) emergency evacuations; 
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency medical assistance can be 
rendered or where the person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or 
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies; 
.„ *i_ -Po;ilir/- in pxercise or perform, any function pursuant to Title 
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73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources - Division of Water Resources; or 
(u) unauthorized access to government records, data, or electronic information systems by any person 
or entity. 
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